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Reading Contrapuntally, Living in the Present:  
An Interview with R. Radhakrishnan 
 
by 
Mina Karavanta 
  
 
Mina Karavanta: In a roundtable discussion entitled "The End of Postcolonial Theory?" recently 
published in the PMLA,1 the debate focuses on the possibility that postcolonial theory is yet another 
"end-narrative" that may operate as a symptom of the "potential exhaustion of postcolonialism as a 
paradigm." Some of the arguments that articulate the pivotal points of the debate are that 
"postcolonialism failed to examine postcolonial empires as changing imperial formations" and, as 
Edward Said and others have argued, "failed to recognize the persistence of neocolonialism, 
imperialism, and the 'structures of dependency'" (Coronil 637). The other view, supported by Wenzel 
and Gikandi, is that the announced but not yet arrived end might very well be a moment of 
recognition and fulfillment of the term and its claims on history as a grand narrative of the West, and 
that if "the era of postcolonial studies is over, it ends just when the need for historically informed 
critique of imperialism could not be more urgent" (Wenzel 634; Gikandi 635). In Diasporic 
Mediations, you argue that postcoloniality (emphasizing upon the term as both an event and a critique 
as opposed to the "ism" in postcolonialism that confounds the two) is the name of the "relationship of 
historical continuity, however problematic, between colonialism and nationalism, and between 
nationalism and its significant Other, the diaspora" (159). 2 Is this relationship now transformed in the 
era of globalization, which only means, as Wenzel puts it, that the term has not been exhausted but is 
in fact needed more than ever? How does your work respond to this debate? 
 
R. Radhakrishnan: The pronouncement of this end narrative does not cause me much concern. The 
question is more about who is making such a pronouncement and on the basis of what credentials 
rather than whether the end narrative holds true or not. The postcolonial itself has often been debated 
as a term; whether it is politically progressive or not, whether the very term is a form of capitulation to 
metropolitan academic avant-gardism or not, whether it elides, in bad faith, the on the ground 
realities of neo-colonialism, whether it really says anything more than terms such as "Third World," 
"Anglo-phone," "Franco-phone," and so on. The temporality of the post or its postality is purely a 
theoretical concept. But, what is a theoretical concept and what is its relationship to history? Why, for 
example, and Homi Bhabha's work comes to mind, does postcoloniality privilege "temporality" at the 
expense of "historicity"? Postcolonial theory is the result of the limited collaboration between certain 
political and intellectual needs and the advent of poststructuralist theory into thinking in general. 
Spivak's work is crucial in this regard. Postcoloniality became postcolonial not in response to political 
agendas but in response to a certain intellectual need and a coalition formed between 
poststructuralism and postcoloniality. This was an extremely exciting correlation but the important 
question is what it signified then and what it signifies now. If postcolonial theory represented anyone 
in the world, whom did it represent? Who is being designated as the end of the postcolonial? 
 
Partly the question is about the category itself. If it is a theoretical construct, then what is its historical 
referent? Is the category itself a theoretical construct of the First World that seeks to de- and re-
territorialize the so-called Third World? Is there, and should there be, an exemplary card-carrying 
subject of postcoloniality? If postcoloniality really is a world-historical category, then is everybody in 
the world now a postcolonial subject? Wouldn't such a global definition dehistoricize that which is 
postcolonial within postcoloniality? Postcolonial theory has also been lambasted for a certain lack of 
definitional clarity, but on the other hand, this very lack of definitional clarity is perceived to be a 
positive trait; not being specific, it can be made available to a broader interchange among different 
constituencies rather than operate merely as a substitute for Anglophone or Francophone or Third 
World or Commonwealth studies. 
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The answer to these questions regarding the end narrative is partly yes and partly no. It is not easy to 
tell, empirically or historically, if something has come to an end. As Raymond Williams reminds us, 
any synchronic moment is simultaneously dominant, hegemonic, residual, and emergent. It is 
certainly a matter, à la Gramsci, of compiling an inventory of multiple historical traces. But the 
fascination with the post is in fact a fascination with breaks and epistemological coupure. To this 
day, for instance, some people think that the term postmodern does not make too much sense for it 
too has been imbued by this end-narrative debate and has undergone the same interrogation, if we 
stop here to think of Habermas' analysis of modernity as an "incomplete project." Hence, the term 
"postmodern" has not been more stable than the term postcolonial, as it means so many different 
things for many different people. In that sense, we need more distance to make such pronouncements. 
What does the pronouncement of this end mean? Does it mean that a certain theoretical paradigm has 
been exhausted, and certain content has been once and for all spoken for and resolved? Can a break, 
for example, be only in theory, but not in practice or in reality? Would this then mean that theoretical 
thinking has gone ahead, non-representationally, ahead of lived history? What then happens to this 
lag? Is theory then in bad faith or is theoretical thinking yet another name for the utopian critique that 
has the obligation to acknowledge a certain immanence without being paralyzed by it? But the most 
important thing to remember in the context of postcoloniality is the critical category of asymmetry.  
 
M. K: When something is invented as a theory, it may already be ahead of history. And then there are 
other moments when the contrary holds true and the theoretical may be a belated narrative that lags 
behind history. If we uphold the claim that postcolonial theory begins with theorists like Said, Bhabha, 
Spivak, the subaltern group, we perceive this theoretical straddle to be always already lagging behind 
politics. Some of the postcolonial critics like Said come from politically troubled territories and are 
bringing their complex involvement in the history of postcoloniality into the West and its intellectual 
terrains where they continue the strife. But in the western intellectual terrain, the effort involves 
staying in touch with the multiple registers of the event of postcoloniality and bridging the gap or 
contrapuntally sustaining the relationship between event and narrative. In this sense, the postcolonial 
operates as a network of discourses that do not operate after, post, the event but sometimes behind it. 
This double register of the postcolonial posits the question of the kind of work that is at hand for 
people like the subaltern group in India and the ways this work differs for the postcolonial critics 
working in the West, reproducing the postcolonial by wrenching it from its context as a textual event 
in the West. Postality then harbors the contradiction between the event and its representation; it is an 
act of writing and representation, an act of rereading history and an act of reproducing this rewriting 
that, for instance, takes the subaltern work out of its context and reconstellates it in other debates and 
discourses of the West. Your work, and especially your recent book History, the Human, and the 
World Between focuses on the act of rereading as an act of revision that is embedded in the politics of 
representation both as a return to the past and as a movement in the present with a view of the "yet-
to-come." You call this a "performative contradiction" that inheres in the relationship between text 
and event. 3 How does this contradiction mark the relationship between the act of reading as an event 
and the act of reproducing it and making it marketable? Can we say that the link between event and 
text is stronger at least in the case of the field of postcolonial studies that has afforded space to a 
politics of intercultural translation and has contributed to the production of what Joan Anim-Addo 
calls "shared knowledges"? 4 
 
R.R.: This question really posits the problematic of postcolonial theory becoming an academic 
formation (to invoke Raymond Williams term of "formation" and distinction from the concept of the 
project). The real question is what exactly Orientalism did achieve that had not been done prior to 
Edward Said's text; there are people and other kinds of work who resent the fact that the inauguration 
or the shift of the field is often identified with the publication of Orientalism for other work had 
already been done in the field. While some people might agree to the evaluation that posits 
Orientalism at the beginnings of the field, they also argue that there had been a lot of work going on 
long before the publication of Said's work. What was unique about Orientalism? It takes a certain kind 
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of academic theory seriously and combines that with questions of political perspectivism. This raises 
another question: who was Said's addressee? Was he speaking for the Orient or for the oriental 
critique of the West? Said's own agency is complex as his position is a position of a multiply informed 
in-between. Does he speak for the non-West? Abdul Jan Mohamed recognizes in Said the specular, 
border intellectual. A lot of people will say that of course he does not and he cannot do so; the best 
thing that Said does is to activate the West for itself in ways that the West has not yet imagined for 
itself. This is a gesture that constitutes the postcolonial as a double performance: as the construction 
of the colonial as an affirmation of itself and as a critique of its colonial past. If one were to say that all 
that the Third World offers as a possibility is critique, it would be a partial statement. However, any 
potential affirmations of the Third World for its own behalf could not be cut off from this critique. The 
question remains as to how you can critically articulate the act of critical negativity with the act of 
affirmation. You live in a space that is neither the one nor the other and this is partly what is 
happening. Hence the critical nature of Said's work that focuses not on identity or the essentialist 
politics of authenticity, but the politics of secular representation. This is where Said's work has 
extraordinary valence for it has come to confront the West with a specific position that can be 
formulated in the following question: Can you be an academic, a professor of literature, and talk about 
certain historical, political and not alone aesthetic issues, and how can you gain and sustain your 
legitimacy to do so? For a generation of postcolonial critics in the West, Said's effect is incalculable for 
his extraordinary and inteventionary erudition that was indissolubly related with the political. Said's 
ability to play the game both as an academic act and a political activist act, to be able to engage the 
political as a professor while reading certain texts not only on non-western but also western grounds 
has radically transformed our fundamental understanding of certain terms like modernity. No longer 
can we simply say modernity without saying "colonial modernity"; it is almost obligatory to do so not 
only to be politically correct but because it is an epistemological imperative. Or take a term like the 
"West" for instance; we know that it is differentiated and there is no such thing as a homogeneous 
"West." Even the non-western and formerly colonized subjects can argue that, and yet, while that is 
true, this term "West" has been used as the name of a systematic and systemic exploitation and abuse 
of the colonized others. Failing to take into account its differentiating dynamic of course results into 
essentialism but it is this essentialism that has traveled over to the colonies. Such an example invokes 
the Achebe and Conrad debate. For Said, Conrad continues to be one of the progenitors of 
postcolonial thought while for Achebe, Conrad is a completely different case: Conrad's text is the body 
of "the horror, the horror."5 
 
M.K: And while being sympathetic to Achebe's abomination at Kurz's "the horror, the horror" and his 
critique of Conrad's contribution to the long history of Africa being misrepresented as the "heart of 
darkness," Said does insist on Conrad and the need to reread his text, especially in view of Achebe's 
rejection. 
 
R.R.: To Said, the coevalness of the colonized with the colonizer is of utmost importance. But while 
this is true, he is mindful of the fact that Conrad is giving hell to the white hegemony. Achebe does not 
recognize this as part of his constitutive plan. And such a reaction is understandable for Achebe's 
response marks the extent to which Third World writers see themselves as part of the other mission, 
which is a critique of the West within the West. So the question is how far you choose to participate. 
For Said, there is a constituency that is constituted at the heart of what I would call the counterpoint. 
The contrapuntal for someone like Aijaz Ahmad, with whom I disagree, sees that as ambivalence. To 
Ahmad "ambivalence" is a flaw, a form of temptation that has to be avoided in the name of the single-
mindedly political. Whereas I would like to believe that "ambivalence" can be made to work 
productively, historically, and agentially. But this also means that a distinction has to be made 
between ambivalence as "given" and ambivalence as a product of historical-theoretical labor. The 
word postcolonial is partly a matter of who the "we" are; if this "we" refers to the theorists and the 
activists, where are they located? Are they in the West or out of the West? What do you mean by the 
West? As regards the end narrative that we addressed earlier, rather than deflect the interaction of the 
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question and not take a position, we need to engage it. When someone says that he or she is a 
postcolonial critic, the real question is this: What work are they doing, and in the name of what 
axiology are they valorizing and legitimating their work? Said says he is doing postcolonial work, I say 
and you say that. How does the postcolonial get constituted as a category in all of these claims is the 
real question. In a typical philosophical fashion, what are the designated objects of its analysis? What 
kind of practice does it involve? Is it concentrated on certain texts that geopolitically refer to the 
postcolonial area? Hence, in the name of postcolonial studies, we are studying political formations, 
certain texts, pursuing a certain analysis. That I think is the clash; you might perceive that you are 
doing postcolonial work and I might say that it is not. Is the postcolonial addressed to some referent 
or signified or to a set of practices, a way of doing things? History and theory come together in certain 
ways: is postcoloniality happening in one place or in any place? The tension lies right there between 
the postcolonial as perspective and postcoloniality as an event. Take, for example, gender studies: 
operating as a category, it provides you with the space to read whatever and not necessarily texts that 
relate to women. The postcolonial is opened up as such a perspective; it is de-categorized and in a 
sense generalized. In that light, you can be doing postcolonial work in reading Edmund Spenser and 
people have been doing that all along. What should then be the property of the field of postcolonial 
studies or of the postcolonial itself? If you are wrenching it from its context and allegorizing it, you 
may not be doing something wrong but then again you may be doing something politically challenging 
or even improper. The tension here is between postcoloniality as allegory and postcoloniality as 
history. 
 
A similar questioning applies to the concept of the postmodern. At what point do you draw the 
distinction between those texts in which the postmodern as an element appears earlier before its 
institutionalization and a certain moment in time when postmodernism has become a full-blown 
thing? Is there a certain event that names the inauguration of the postmodern versus the idea that 
potentially everything is postmodern? Is Melville postmodern, or is Sterne postmodern? When is the 
postmodern merely episodic and when can it be said to have come of age as a coherent epistemology? 
The same way you can be a feminist and read Shakespeare. When is something a perspective and 
when is it a substance, a determinate content? We need to think through the strange and estranging, 
non-dialectical relationship between the content of the area from which a methodology springs up and 
the field where the methodology goes beyond its proper historical boundaries. 
 
M.K: What you make clear in your response is that, in all of these narratives, there is always an 
incommensurable difference between event and narrative, between postcoloniality and the 
postcolonial. I think that there is always the danger of reducing the one to the other. One the one 
hand, we have an event, a very heterogeneous event, and on the other hand, we have a network of 
discourses and narratives that represent, revise―to invoke here your beautiful reading of revisionism 
in the second chapter of History, the Human and the World Between―and reproduce the event(s). 
And this network is not only a web of representations that reread and revise history and politics but 
also a site for the production of the historical and the political. This invokes Walter Mignolo's idea that 
all the non-western productions of terms exhausted in the West―like the term modernity―are 
conducive to knowledge production, new modernities, new "border gnoseologies" that take place 
where the West considers to be the non-western world.6 The reconstellation of terms in foreign 
terrains and contexts produces a proliferation of texts that propose acts of rereading that are neither 
nostalgic nor revisionist. Said engages Conrad's Heart of Darkness as a text that can be critically 
reread; in opposition to Achebe's austere, albeit justifiable rejection―an act of rereading itself―Said 
offers the possibility of recognizing the human question through the complicity of the colonial and 
postcolonial cultures with the metropolitan culture. You argue that this act of revision is not a 
nostalgic act of rewriting or rereading the past in order to clarify, correct, and fix it to a single 
interpretation but an affirmation, a statement, a new vision of the present, a vision that articulates the 
political event of what Derrida's "imaginative grammar"7 names as the "yet-to-come." Could you 
elaborate on the connection between the return to the past and the turn to the present? 
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R.R.: The idea of the return, and here I invoke Fanon, Adrienne Rich, and Nietzsche non-identically, 
the notion of the return, is part of the question as to where everything is happening. Is the event a 
singular event tied to history? Is there something to return to? Is a return necessarily nostalgic, and if 
so, in the name of what? Or, is the return purely modal and methodological without guarantees? 
Nothing may be found, or what is found may not be what one thought one was going to find. The 
theme of the return is the classic theme of historiography. Why indeed return? Does every subject 
have to return, or are some subjects more tied to the imperative of the return motif? Is the return 
ontic, ontological, historical? I have discussed this topic at length in the first chapter of my recent 
book from Duke. Let's switch to Said, who for example returns to Conrad obsessively. France is 
postcolonial and so is Algeria, England is postcolonial and so is India, but with a difference. Following 
Said, we could say that the question of the return concerns the extent to which you want to keep the 
doubleness alive. And to see the doubleness as historically valid means to establish coevalness rather 
than to assert separatism. Should India return to Colonialism for ever as it endeavors to historicize 
itself? It is certainly the context in which globalization is happening. Something called the West is 
being reproduced all over the world not in any kind of normative way as the world is being hybridized. 
The West after all is not necessarily the property of the West. 
 
I think that Du Bois' concept of "double consciousness" can be critically operative in the problematic 
of the postcolonial. The word postcolonial characterizes a variety of countries, and there are different 
accountabilities involved. The term "post" retains the colonial and the tension between the two, as the 
"post" does not rid of the colonial. This does not imply a "forgetting of" but rather a "keeping in 
tension." The "post" after what? The moment you posit this question, there is colonialism looming 
large. Then we negotiate in what different ways this double contingency is realized, whether in the 
form of a macro location or a micro-political subject position. This is exactly what Said refers to as an 
irresolvable asymmetry in his beautiful essay, "Intellectuals in the Postcolonial World." Said's work is 
very important in this respect for he engages the following questions: How do you maintain a 
contrapuntal reading and mobilize each memory politically? Is the counterpoint a primarily aesthetic 
figure that contains opposition or is there a "real" in the counterpoint? 
 
M.K: I think that you are absolutely right. Said's proposition for an engaged contrapuntal reading in 
and of the world, what he offers as the essence of secular criticism, is an important act of rereading, an 
act that brings together temporalities that remain irreducible to each other and yet are forced into a 
co-existence with each other. This is of course a critical co-existence that complicates rather than 
resolves the praxis of secular criticism, a complexity that drives Aamir Mufti to aptly invert the terms 
and name this kind of critique "critical secularism."8 This act of contrapuntal reading shades a terrain, 
a territory of secular contradictions and affiliations that come to the fore through this act of reading. 
 
R.R.: And this brings us to wonder about the contrapuntal and the counterpoint. Is the counterpoint 
a primarily aesthetic figure that is intrinsic to the text? Does it contain opposition within itself or does 
it emerge from a really antagonistic act? What do we make of the effort of the counterpoint to secede 
from the text or its context and inaugurate its own project of critique and exercise? If a certain work is 
contrapuntal, is it contrapuntal essentially? In other words, is the counterpoint an essentially 
structural element? Suddenly you encounter the counterpoint at a particular moment in Bach's text 
but it is not necessarily manifested throughout the text. But if the counterpoint is a structural element 
and not a mere synecdoche, then once it is removed, it makes no or little sense. A connoisseur of 
music, Said is interested in the contrapuntal as a fundamental structural element that offers an 
analytical, hermeneutic, even world historical way of understanding the differential. It is also a 
question about the relationship of reciprocity to antagonism. Which founds which? How does 
"recognition" operate within the aesthetic figurality of the counterpoint? It is the space where the 
work of collaboration, even impossible togetherness can operate. The same element is manifested in 
the debate between Gandhi and Tagore. Tagore, a polymath, a musician, a philosopher, turns to 
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Gandhi to whom he gives all the credit for his political and intellectual effort to claim India's right to 
independence, and offers him the gift of critical solidarity. "Yes, you are the man, we follow you," he 
seems to be saying, but this act of embrace has to engage critique. To Gandhi's call for a forceful and 
unwavering political non-co-operation, Tagore offers the vision of fusion. Not that he denies the 
reality of colonialism, but he understands it differently, as a poet, as an artist who wishes to establish a 
different relationship to the political as such. Contrapuntality also has to do with issues of 
synchronicity: in which or in whose time is the counterpoint being performed?  
 
M.K.: Tagore seems to be laying a claim on a politics of reading that will enable the subjects of the 
new independence to claim and formulate their history through a persistent deconstruction of that 
history and its hyperreality. His position is the articulation of a hope for a kind of freedom and release 
that will not be reductive and oversimplifying. Dipesh Chakrabarty analyzes this concept of 
"hyperreality" in Provincializing Europe and produces a narration of that history that is responsible 
for consolidating the boundaries in the world, the history that produced its own structure by inflating 
the real and substituting it with the hyperreal. 9 The subject involved is forced to deal with it as a 
hyperreality, as a kind of fiction that cannot however be the only element that is constitutive of reality. 
 
R.R.: Yes, it is an act of de-epistemologizing the effects and claims of colonialism. It is like the truth of 
racism, which, as Nietzsche would put it, is the truth of a lie. The racist discourse has actually made 
truth claims. How do you deal with it? 
 
M.K: I think that you deal with it as if this were not the only element constitutive of your freedom and 
your future. It reminds me of that moment in Toni Morrison's Beloved where Baby Suggs takes the 
community to the woods for a healing ritual; right there, at the heart of the clearing, she asks them to 
celebrate the present and think of the future while helping them heal themselves and their bodies of 
the past that cannot be erased but has to be dealt with. So the past is present but the future of this 
community is the real imperative. Tagore seems to be asking for a kind of revision that in your work 
you have elaborated on as a kind of return that is not constituted by the past but is informed by the 
demands of the present and the future. But of course, there is a double gesture/register that creates 
the problematic. On the one hand, you have the performance of going back, a return that is nostalgic 
and painful, suggesting that you may not be able to overcome the always already return to the ruins, to 
those things that you are burdened with at the outset of your journey. Then there is what I read as 
performativity that produces a kind of journey out of this return and allows the subject to follow a 
trace not in the past any more but in the future. This reading of the ruin as both the wreck, namely, as 
something that belongs to another history that happened, and as the trace that now leads you to the 
present and the future, may be the actual work of tracing the trace that will lead you not away from the 
wreck in an act of self-willed oblivion but out of it. Again this double gesture of critique looks for the 
limit of the act of reading, and is caught between the praxis of theorizing and the strife for the 
political. Can we think of this return as a double gesture: as a performance operating as a way of 
rewriting and revision and as a performative gesture marking the present and the new? 
 
R.R.: It is a doubleness that reveals the operation of a perspective. The question is to what degree the 
perspective is inevitable and to what degree one is capable of recognizing the limitations of this 
perspective; one names this as an act of freedom, that is, freedom from something that one can 
identify and name. If freedom is nothing but freedom from the master, then, the very value of freedom 
itself is in some sense mitigated and limited. Given the historical condition, how is the question of 
freedom asked? That is a doubleness of location; within location comes a certain finitude. For 
instance, I am envisioning freedom as a woman, a subaltern, an ex-slave, a lesbian; what is the 
semantico-ideological burden of the "as a" here? What is the relationship between freedom as such, 
the name-less and un-namable freedom, and the freedom that is wrested historically from a certain 
privation. Moreover, as Tagore would ask of Gandhi, is freedom something that the subject gives 
herself, or is freedom always a freedom from a certain historical master/oppressor?  
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This strife reveals some of the different ways by which history is problematized. The truth of history 
itself, one might claim, is a generic truth. In my forthcoming book, When is the Political, 10 I discuss 
history as a genre and the way in which history as a fact returns home and unsettles it. It will be 
interesting to investigate this doubleness of history and see why, for instance, Morrison returns to the 
history of slavery. It is a case that reveals the contingencies of the doubleness to the past: on the one 
hand, the past enables you but, on the other hand, you are up against the hex, the nightmare of 
history. This posits the question of how you experience history under different conditions, how history 
affirms or denies subject positions and realities, and how this is distributed around the world in 
different geopolitical locations and different subject positions. This is symptomatically revealed in the 
doubleness that constitutes the counterpoint. The first question that is posited is the statue of its 
limitations. Lynching, for instance, has to be narrated and remembered. Then a question emerges: at 
which point do you say that there is an original moment, like the Middle Passage, that constitutes 
slavery and how do you reconcile that impossible moment with the present? W.E.B Du Bois offers the 
path of "double consciousness" as a way of reading history contrapuntally intertwining the historical 
with the political. The contrapuntal and "double consciousness" can be inaugural principles of a 
politics of rereading that tries to attend to the text and the event without abiding by invested political 
interests. And of course the most difficult challenge is how to read the future anterior in the present 
moment. The Gandhi and Tagore debate symptomatically reveals that challenge. Gandhi may be 
sympathetic to Tagore's proposition for a politics of fusion that allows the poet to be as transgressive 
as possible thus keeping multiple possibilities open. It is a kind of deferment that the poet may be able 
to afford but Gandhi claims his position as the position of the politician dealing with a specific event 
called colonialism. In that context, they are debating in the semantics of affirmation and negation. 
And, of course, Tagore is not saying "yes" to colonialism; instead, he is saying "no" to a politics of 
negation. As a mystic poet, he is saying "yes" to life and to the possibility of foreclosing negative 
misrecognition. That is the status of the affirmative: let his be a "yes" as a state of being, for at some 
point the negatives will not add up to a positive. 
 
M.K: It is a debate that unconceals the problematic of critique, as a problematic informed by the 
complexity of this "ay" and "nay" politics. Critique is tied to the limits of epistemologies; it aims at 
finding the breaks, producing close readings that are attentive to fissures and margins, and operates 
as a gesture that is both analytical and envisioning. Critique is caught too much between the two and 
the praxis of affirmation often appears to be overwritten by the return of critique to these breaks and 
fissures. As much as we like Derrida, the possibility of critique that is offered through his "imaginative 
grammar" does not always appear to be adequate to the conditions of neo-colonialism. The impatience 
that critique produces seems to be counterproductive to its ability to envision the "yet-to-come" and 
the impossible possible in an affirmative way. Do you see a rupture in this problematic, especially in 
view of your work that I find it to be always already attentive to a "conjunctural articulation" of the 
political, the literary and the theoretical? 
 
R.R.: One of the first questions you pose and Derrida poses too is whether critique can have a 
corporeal referent; to what extent critique is heteronomous and to what extent autonomous. It is 
autonomous modally but heteronomous ideologically. For a critique to be truly effective, it has to be 
heterogeneous with its object, but heterogeneous semantically, ideologically, paradigmatically, and 
modally. The problem of critique is the question of situatedness and how you mix in a certain 
heteronomy with a certain autonomy. In that light, Said's concept of secular criticism is very 
important. There are some cases in which the secular does not sit well with some people and then it is 
a matter of historicizing or de-historicizing it. The real question is whether you can separate the 
advantages of secularism from the conditions under which it has been introduced. It may be good but 
it was introduced to you at a moment when it inferiorized your other subject and ideological positions. 
How do you separate out that particular historical moment which has a certain hegemonic force? If 
only you could forget the fact that it is indissolubly related with the praxis of colonialism, then it 
would be a fantastic moment (utopic as it sounds). There were writers who wanted to write like 
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Virginia Woolf in India, despite their profound awareness of the colonizing and hegemonic force of 
English. But in a strange way and crazy way, they were able to be attracted to Virginia Woolf and 
appreciate the superb writer that she is. It seems to me that in the postcolonial context the secular 
becomes the site of critique: and when something becomes a critique, in a strange way it becomes 
unmarked. Endorsing and questioning secularism; the critic becomes a referee in an endless game. 
 
M.K: In Theory in an Uneven World, you define globality as a utopia sans politics or actually as the 
"utopian resolution of the problems of the world" that has "bracketed away once and for all questions 
of representation and ideological perspectivism" (99). 11 This is a clear position against Hardt and 
Negri and other theorists of globalization, who embrace the positive possibilities of globality as the 
empire of the multitude, as the site where new alliances and coalitions between the peoples not of 
nations any longer but of the world can be formed. How can this "multitude" be conceptualized in 
politically operative and heterogeneous ways? 
 
R.R.: Allow me to answer the question with a story. In Madras, there is this plaza called Spenser 
Plaza. Fancy staff, expensive...high tech promo at the heart of the city. To be able to spend money 
there, you have to be rich, internationally rich. You have to have really transcended affluence in local 
terms and be rich universally. One of my good friends used to own a bookstore in that Plaza and I used 
to hang out every time I visited Madras. On the sidewalk, there was an amputated person on a little 
platform on wheels that he would move with his hands. He is a beggar person, a beggar human being. 
And I would see him every day and we would talk about politics. Maybe you would here say that this is 
my middle-class morality taking a guilt-free ride: he would come to say "hello" and I would talk to him 
to alleviate myself of guilt. And yet, here we are, two human beings talking to each other. In those 
days, I would give him a thousand rupees (which is about two and a half dollars). So here we are in the 
center of this affluent place forming a relationship: he is a fellow human being and at the same time he 
is not. Can I deal with the unevenness that globalization perpetuates? In this immense Spenser Plaza, 
he is sitting there and there are people going by; two incommensurable realities co-exist and are non-
dialectically juxtaposed. I am part of that scene and I am interpellated by globalization just as he is. 
After the bookstore closed, I stopped going. I went by the last time I was there with my son, Surya, and 
this person saw me and came up to me to greet me. He came to say "hello" and I was dumbfounded 
that he even remembered me. He wondered why he had not seen me for a long time and tried to start 
up a conversation with me. In which language do I talk to this person? How do you deal with the 
situation? How do we talk to each other? That is the real question. Globalization permits these 
adjacencies, as there are no concepts or constituencies and subject positions completely isolated from 
each other. 
 
M.K: There you have a contrapuntal moment before which even critique remains speechless. 
 
R.R.: This is a human situation though. In Precarious Life, Judith Butler says that we all know loss. 12 
And as much as I attend to that position, I also argue that there are losses and losses. How do you deal 
with loss? The Iraqi mother losing her child and the American mother losing her child are equal in a 
human sense, but the human itself is the result of a certain unevenness and sovereign bearing. How do 
you then create a calculus that will regulate and measure bearing, suffering, and pain? Given that 
moment of human suffering, there is a contradiction in terms of how one is taught to bear that 
suffering. As an American, you might be taught that one American life is worth a thousand Iraqi lives, 
and that your life is above a Palestinian's life, or that a Palestinian is less than human. So there is 
really a problem in saying loss to conjure all human loss at once, for loss too can be engineered.  
 
M.K: Or we can say that they speak the same―loss, suffering, pain―but they always already 
experience the same in different ways, sometimes radically different ways. But that difference does not 
privilege the one over the other for, as you say, who can measure this? Do you then think that 
precisely because of this incommensurable sameness and difference, we are in need of a kind of 
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critique that is open to critical affiliations yet unimagined and maybe unimaginable? A kind of critique 
that is attentive to the literary and the political concurrently? 
 
R.R.: Your question really posits the question of the collective "we" that is at stake. I am not 
advocating a politics of the oppressed but when two singularities are thought together, then all kinds 
of different temporalities emanate. But who is the collective subject? Who is mourning for universal 
loss? Even if we ask this question on the level of the subject, the position is very complex. It is both a 
person as well as a certain citizen or unconstituted constituency. Foucault, for instance, is interested 
in non-sovereign ways of engaging truth even as he advocates that there can be no exit from 
interpellation. But the question is how do we go beyond the "shadow lines," to invoke here Amitav 
Ghosh's beautiful novel. I would say, by working through them. The shadow lines are borderlines, the 
lines of nationalism that separate people. They are real but you need to render them shadowy by 
eviscerating them of their legitimacy. You do not thus bypass the metaphysical or the vicious 
hermeneutic circle but you go through it in a certain way. There is a moment when you come out not 
in the sense that you will find the answer but in the sense that you will arrive at a more nuanced 
position. 
 
M.K: Can we then say that this way is a multiply informed politics of rereading, a contrapuntal critical 
praxis, and the more nuanced position is the time of the political, as the time of the present as it is 
happening and not as it is inherited? 
 
R.R.: Yes, critique in the name of the right here, the right now, always already challenging us in the 
present, always already ahead of discourse, ahead of us. 
 
 
DECEMBER 2008 
 
 
1 See Patricia Yaeger's "Editor's Column: The End of Postcolonial Theory? A Roundtable with Sunil Agnani, 
Fernando Coronil, Gaurar Desai, Mamadou Diouf, Simon Gikandi, Susie Tharu, Jennifer Wenzel." PMLA 122. 3 
(May 2007): pp. 633-51. 
2 R. Radhakrishnan. Diasporic Mediations. Between Home and Location, (Minneapolis & London: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996). 
3 See R.Radhakrishnan's History, the Human and the World Between (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008). 
4 See Joan Anim-Addo's Touching the Body. History, Language & African Caribbean Women's Writing 
(London: Mango Publishing, 2007).  
5 For a further analysis of this position, see Edward Said's Culture and Imperialism and especially Chapter One, 
"Overlapping Territories, Intertwined Histories" (New York: Vintage Books, 1994). See also Chinua Achebe's "An 
Image of Africa: Racism in Conrad's Heart of Darkness," in Hopes and Impediments: Selected Essays (New 
York: Doubleday, Anchor, 1989. 1-20). 
6 For a further analysis of "border gnoseologies," see Walter D. Mignolo's Local Histories/Global Designs 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
7 I am borrowing this term from Nina Morgan's powerful analysis of Derrida's "grammar." 
8 See Aamir R. Mufti's "Critical Secularism: A Reintroduction for Perilous Times." Critical Secularism, a special 
issue of boundary 2 (ed. Aamir R. Mufti), 31. 2 (2004): 1-9. 
9 For an analysis of Europe as a "hyperreality," see Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000).  
10  See R.Radhakrishnan's When is the Political? (Durham: Duke University Press, forthcoming). 
11 See R. Radhakrishnan's Theory in an Uneven World (Malden & Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003). 
12 See Judith Butler's analysis of the human in Precarious Life (New York & London: Verso, 2004). 
 
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 07:11:50 |
